Even on your account you seem to admit there is no changing inclination "at will", if by at will we mean something like "reflexively/instantly without conscious effort or thought and yet still voluntarily" . If you could alter inclinations at will in that sense, it would mean no effort, your current inclinations would change before they had a chance to cause discomfort/effort over trying to change them etc.
I find sometimes I do some acts thoughtlessly and find them natural and voluntary and sometimes I find them involuntary and regrettable ("I did not mean to do that"). This is all very tricky (lots of implicit self-reference, unclear distinctions and who knows what else), I am just groping for possibly relevant phenomenon to talk about.
I think I'd unify deliberatively choosing actions and inclinations the other way around (ignoring thoughtless action). Most seem to admit we can change our inclinations as you say "indirectly" via "habituation", if I eat small amounts of a food I find offensive I may "gain a taste for it" and so on (seems likely there are limits could people with the "cilantro tastes like soap gene" really gain the same taste for cilantro the rest of us have?). What if choosing to raise your arm etc. is likewise achieved indirectly just somewhat more reliably and with many of the intermediate steps hidden from conscious notice/recollection.
Due to stuff the left side of my face is paralyzed. When I will the movement of the left side of my face, I feel as though I have done it, so long as I don't look in the mirror or put my hand on my face to verify the motion. So my sense that I have willed something is fallible. It seems plausible to me that when I will the motion of my face I kick off a chain of events, in the right side of my face this chain goes off without a hitch, in the left side it does not. I feel like I am wholly aware of the chain on my right side, but this is belied by the fact that moving either left or right can feel very similar despite differences down the chain.
I used to walk around with an umbrella whenever it "looked like rain", but that often meant walking around with an umbrella when it was not raining. To amuse myself as I walked I would try to balance the umbrella on my finger. At first I had to expend a lot of conscious effort to try and keep the umbrella upright, consciously moving my finger, I never got that good at it, but as I got better I thought about the moving of my finger less (consciously anyway), but the finger did move.
Learning a complex skill to carry out a task is in my experience like changing an inclination. I could not directly will that the umbrella remain upright on my fniger. Heck I could not at first directly will that I solve a 2nd Order Partial Differential Equation (and I don't think I could do it now as I've been out of practice for 25 years), only by indirect means could I acquire the capacity and yet I can voluntarily. So perhaps the stuff we "directly" will is just stuff we learned the skill of indirectly long enough ago and thoroughly enough we forgot the intermediaries.
So maybe the amount of stuff we will "directly" is just far smaller than must of us are tempted to think? Although if we unify the deliberative choice of action and inclination, I suppose it does not make much difference at which end.
Hi! So I don't take "at will" to mean "reflexively/instantly without conscious effort or thought and yet still voluntarily." I can pick up the book beside me at will, even though I probably won't do that reflexively or without conscious thought. And if it's a heavy book, I won't be able to do it without effort.
I agree that all actions are more or less indirect as a causal matter; to have something be under my control there has to be a causal link between my choice and the relevant state of affairs. But in some cases there's nothing "between" the effect and my choice that is present in my practical reasoning, and that would be the most direct kind of action.
Say Ted is wearing a feather boa. Can Ted be not wearing a feather boa? In one sense, yes, by removing it the next moment. In another sense, no, because removing it is at best an action of Ted-later, and I'm talking about Ted-right-now.
This may seem like pretty pedantic Theseus's Ship stuff, but it's what should come to mind every time someone suggests, "You can do what you will, but you can't will what you will." As long as we're stratifying our "you"s across time, you possibly (open per epistemic uncertainty about the future) can, for a great number of willful things.
In a moment of time, I am stuck with the inclinations I have, donning a feather boa, and being only okay at guitar. But with effort I can alter those inclinations, fling the feather boa away, and get better at guitar. We're all ever-evolving dynamos, and when we count all of our "selves" in a timestrung community, it's easier to see how much canonical agency philosophy is awash in very basic equivalence slop. (See my 2024 article on "What Is Is and Isn't.")
Really good post, imo. I take issue with one thing you say, but I think even with my objection your point stands strong (perhaps stronger, even).
You say, “So, desire is action in abstraction from circumstance—that is to say, deliberating about what to desire is the same as deliberating about what to do in general, setting aside the particularities of a given circumstance one may consider.”
Yet, I think the act of deliberating what to desire is at least in some sense distinct. Take your example of desiring money. It’s an illustrative one because we seem to attach a certain sort of moral weight to the desire for money in and of itself. That is so say, we seem to attach some quality to the desire which is distinct from the desire itself.
Take two men who will both take money all else equal. One of the men has a strong inclination towards money, i.e. will profess that it’s something he wants for its own sake. The second man does not desire money, he has no real sense that it’s good for him and he doesn’t get any sort of pleasure from the gaining of money itself, but will choose it all the same.
These two men are very similar, and I don’t think it would be unfair to say they both have an inclination towards money. Yet, we seem to attach a different moral worth to the second man, seem to think that what he’s doing is in some sense nobler than the first. Thus, we seem to separate the deliberation as to what to desire from what to do in general. It may be perfectly fine to choose money in general, but the inclination towards it is the issue.
Maybe the second man is in bad faith, but if he is, we seem to all buy into it if we are comfortable ever attaching moral weight to desires. Yes, the child predator is bad. But is the inclination towards attraction to young people bad? Many would say, “Yes!” even if the person is non-offending. We wish to change that inclination.
Maybe this is a polite fantasy, but I think it point to exactly what you are saying. We acknowledge in some sense that we CAN change our desires if we attach a moral weight to them. It would be absurd to attach any moral weight to inclinations if they have no reason, no internal logic to them which can be freely discarded. We also decouple to act of deliberating about doing in general and deliberating about desire or preference.
>In all of these [psychological approaches], the “infection by a mind virus” depends on the susceptibility of the mind itself to generate unwanted thought patterns after a cue. This is one way the “virus” metaphor is apt: viruses depend necessarily on host biochemistry to complete their lifecycles. The situation is not as simple as a glib “it’s up to you whether or not what you see affects you,” since dispositions to be affected by what we see can be deep, but for those willing to put significant practice into cognitive self-mastery, therapeutic introspection, Stoic asceticism, Buddhist meditation, or Christian prayer, perhaps it can be up to them.
I was seriously considering including the Kantian model of thought among the compared approaches, too, but I decided it would be too much. I wanted to survey them imprecisely, and Kantian thought particularly demands precision.
If I'm a fifth grader, and I'm like, "I'VE THOUGHT ABOUT IT AND DECIDED I WANT TO BE A MAGICIAN THAT ONLY PERFORMS AT FUNERALS" has this fifth grader simply been deliberating about whether to take actions that promote doing magic at funerals? Can't they just, like, have committed themselves to a certain fantasy they enjoy having? It just seems like figuring out what you want in life can (unfortunately) merely amount to enjoying the idea of what it would be like to have what you want. And it doesn't seem like fantasizing needs to itself be an action which promotes the achievement of what you’re fantasizing about.
The fact that certain inclinations coincide with certain pleasures or pains and that these inclinations do not follow necessarily from these pains or pleasures does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that these inclinations are objects of choice or will. I think that it is plausible to assert that these inclinations are subject to psychological limitations, such as personality, trauma, etc. Moral culpability likewise would not extend to those persons who are incapable of exercising choice due to psychological limitations.
Even on your account you seem to admit there is no changing inclination "at will", if by at will we mean something like "reflexively/instantly without conscious effort or thought and yet still voluntarily" . If you could alter inclinations at will in that sense, it would mean no effort, your current inclinations would change before they had a chance to cause discomfort/effort over trying to change them etc.
I find sometimes I do some acts thoughtlessly and find them natural and voluntary and sometimes I find them involuntary and regrettable ("I did not mean to do that"). This is all very tricky (lots of implicit self-reference, unclear distinctions and who knows what else), I am just groping for possibly relevant phenomenon to talk about.
I think I'd unify deliberatively choosing actions and inclinations the other way around (ignoring thoughtless action). Most seem to admit we can change our inclinations as you say "indirectly" via "habituation", if I eat small amounts of a food I find offensive I may "gain a taste for it" and so on (seems likely there are limits could people with the "cilantro tastes like soap gene" really gain the same taste for cilantro the rest of us have?). What if choosing to raise your arm etc. is likewise achieved indirectly just somewhat more reliably and with many of the intermediate steps hidden from conscious notice/recollection.
Due to stuff the left side of my face is paralyzed. When I will the movement of the left side of my face, I feel as though I have done it, so long as I don't look in the mirror or put my hand on my face to verify the motion. So my sense that I have willed something is fallible. It seems plausible to me that when I will the motion of my face I kick off a chain of events, in the right side of my face this chain goes off without a hitch, in the left side it does not. I feel like I am wholly aware of the chain on my right side, but this is belied by the fact that moving either left or right can feel very similar despite differences down the chain.
I used to walk around with an umbrella whenever it "looked like rain", but that often meant walking around with an umbrella when it was not raining. To amuse myself as I walked I would try to balance the umbrella on my finger. At first I had to expend a lot of conscious effort to try and keep the umbrella upright, consciously moving my finger, I never got that good at it, but as I got better I thought about the moving of my finger less (consciously anyway), but the finger did move.
Learning a complex skill to carry out a task is in my experience like changing an inclination. I could not directly will that the umbrella remain upright on my fniger. Heck I could not at first directly will that I solve a 2nd Order Partial Differential Equation (and I don't think I could do it now as I've been out of practice for 25 years), only by indirect means could I acquire the capacity and yet I can voluntarily. So perhaps the stuff we "directly" will is just stuff we learned the skill of indirectly long enough ago and thoroughly enough we forgot the intermediaries.
So maybe the amount of stuff we will "directly" is just far smaller than must of us are tempted to think? Although if we unify the deliberative choice of action and inclination, I suppose it does not make much difference at which end.
Hope this is relevant.
Hi! So I don't take "at will" to mean "reflexively/instantly without conscious effort or thought and yet still voluntarily." I can pick up the book beside me at will, even though I probably won't do that reflexively or without conscious thought. And if it's a heavy book, I won't be able to do it without effort.
I agree that all actions are more or less indirect as a causal matter; to have something be under my control there has to be a causal link between my choice and the relevant state of affairs. But in some cases there's nothing "between" the effect and my choice that is present in my practical reasoning, and that would be the most direct kind of action.
Nice post!
Say Ted is wearing a feather boa. Can Ted be not wearing a feather boa? In one sense, yes, by removing it the next moment. In another sense, no, because removing it is at best an action of Ted-later, and I'm talking about Ted-right-now.
This may seem like pretty pedantic Theseus's Ship stuff, but it's what should come to mind every time someone suggests, "You can do what you will, but you can't will what you will." As long as we're stratifying our "you"s across time, you possibly (open per epistemic uncertainty about the future) can, for a great number of willful things.
In a moment of time, I am stuck with the inclinations I have, donning a feather boa, and being only okay at guitar. But with effort I can alter those inclinations, fling the feather boa away, and get better at guitar. We're all ever-evolving dynamos, and when we count all of our "selves" in a timestrung community, it's easier to see how much canonical agency philosophy is awash in very basic equivalence slop. (See my 2024 article on "What Is Is and Isn't.")
Looking forward to more of your stuff.
Really good post, imo. I take issue with one thing you say, but I think even with my objection your point stands strong (perhaps stronger, even).
You say, “So, desire is action in abstraction from circumstance—that is to say, deliberating about what to desire is the same as deliberating about what to do in general, setting aside the particularities of a given circumstance one may consider.”
Yet, I think the act of deliberating what to desire is at least in some sense distinct. Take your example of desiring money. It’s an illustrative one because we seem to attach a certain sort of moral weight to the desire for money in and of itself. That is so say, we seem to attach some quality to the desire which is distinct from the desire itself.
Take two men who will both take money all else equal. One of the men has a strong inclination towards money, i.e. will profess that it’s something he wants for its own sake. The second man does not desire money, he has no real sense that it’s good for him and he doesn’t get any sort of pleasure from the gaining of money itself, but will choose it all the same.
These two men are very similar, and I don’t think it would be unfair to say they both have an inclination towards money. Yet, we seem to attach a different moral worth to the second man, seem to think that what he’s doing is in some sense nobler than the first. Thus, we seem to separate the deliberation as to what to desire from what to do in general. It may be perfectly fine to choose money in general, but the inclination towards it is the issue.
Maybe the second man is in bad faith, but if he is, we seem to all buy into it if we are comfortable ever attaching moral weight to desires. Yes, the child predator is bad. But is the inclination towards attraction to young people bad? Many would say, “Yes!” even if the person is non-offending. We wish to change that inclination.
Maybe this is a polite fantasy, but I think it point to exactly what you are saying. We acknowledge in some sense that we CAN change our desires if we attach a moral weight to them. It would be absurd to attach any moral weight to inclinations if they have no reason, no internal logic to them which can be freely discarded. We also decouple to act of deliberating about doing in general and deliberating about desire or preference.
Anyway great post!
Fun, this same issue came up in a post I sent out two days before – https://blackthornhedge.substack.com/p/common-sense-against-mind-viruses
Most directly relevant quote:
>In all of these [psychological approaches], the “infection by a mind virus” depends on the susceptibility of the mind itself to generate unwanted thought patterns after a cue. This is one way the “virus” metaphor is apt: viruses depend necessarily on host biochemistry to complete their lifecycles. The situation is not as simple as a glib “it’s up to you whether or not what you see affects you,” since dispositions to be affected by what we see can be deep, but for those willing to put significant practice into cognitive self-mastery, therapeutic introspection, Stoic asceticism, Buddhist meditation, or Christian prayer, perhaps it can be up to them.
I was seriously considering including the Kantian model of thought among the compared approaches, too, but I decided it would be too much. I wanted to survey them imprecisely, and Kantian thought particularly demands precision.
If I'm a fifth grader, and I'm like, "I'VE THOUGHT ABOUT IT AND DECIDED I WANT TO BE A MAGICIAN THAT ONLY PERFORMS AT FUNERALS" has this fifth grader simply been deliberating about whether to take actions that promote doing magic at funerals? Can't they just, like, have committed themselves to a certain fantasy they enjoy having? It just seems like figuring out what you want in life can (unfortunately) merely amount to enjoying the idea of what it would be like to have what you want. And it doesn't seem like fantasizing needs to itself be an action which promotes the achievement of what you’re fantasizing about.
Seems cool but SO MANY WORDS, SUCH LONG PARAGRAPHS, AAAAAAA
My brother in Christ you are on a blogging site
Listen, I haven’t read it yet so i can’t be sure you’re being wordy, but
On reflection, the paragraphs maybe aren’t that long, just look long on an iPhone13 mini. But still, SO MANY WORDS, AAAAAA
The fact that certain inclinations coincide with certain pleasures or pains and that these inclinations do not follow necessarily from these pains or pleasures does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that these inclinations are objects of choice or will. I think that it is plausible to assert that these inclinations are subject to psychological limitations, such as personality, trauma, etc. Moral culpability likewise would not extend to those persons who are incapable of exercising choice due to psychological limitations.